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L INTRODUCTION
Picture a young couple, sweethearts since high school and happily
married for several years. The couple finds they are unable to bear their
own children. This information devastates the couple for a short while, but
the desire to raise a family quickly directs their attention to their only
* Editor'sNote: This Note received the Gertrude Brick Prize for the Outstanding Note
written during the Spring 2000.
** In memory of my cousin Michael.
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alternative: adoption. At least we will be able to adopt a healthy baby, the
prospective parents muse, struggling to find optimism in their unfortunate
situation. Placing themselves at the mercy of an adoption agency of
national renown, the couple requests a child with a healthy profile. The
agency introduces the prospective parents to a vibrant baby, born to a
successful woman who could not handle raising the infant after the
startling death of the child's father. A plausible story, an adorable baby
boy, and a couple looking for someone to love. The couple finalizes the
adoption, and names their baby Michael.
Regrettably, the adoption agency which placed Michael with parents
Marty and Phyllis Juman intentionally withheld the young boy's true
medical history.' Michael's mother was not a college-educated woman
with a temporary bout of melancholy associated with the loss of her
boyfriend. 2 Rather, Michael's mother had a severe mental illness, one
which led to a frontal lobotomy years before Michael was born.3 Michael
himself discovered these devastating facts while searching for the source4
of his own schizophrenia, an illness which ultimately took his life.
Tormented by the suffering of his parents as they struggled to understand
and deal with his wrenching illness, Michael relentlessly pursued the
adoption agency which placed him with his unsuspecting parents.5 Only
one month prior to his untimely death, Michael and his parents achieved
a measure of justice. Michael lived to witness the State6 of New York
recognize the tort of wrongful adoption for the first time.
This Note explores several of the themes comprising the debate around
wrongful adoption. Part II chronicles the development of wrongful
adoption as a cause of action. Part Ill examines the current positive trend
towards recognizing a duty on adoption agencies to disclose known health
and family information to adoptive parents. Part IV considers the recent
scholarly works supporting a duty to investigate, and exposes some of the
weaknesses in their arguments. Part V visits a relatively unexplored aspect
of this devastating cause of action-the phenomenon of uncompensated
loss associated with a failure of the courts to expand common law recovery
mechanisms to encompass the emotional injuries suffered by victims of
wrongful adoption.

1. See Juman v. Louise Wise Serv., 663 N.Y.S.2d 483,485 (N.Y. App. Div.) (1997).

2. See id.

3. See id.
4. See Stephanie Saul, Michael's Law, NEWSDAY, LONG ISLAND NEWSPAPER, Aug. 31,
1997, at A58-59.
5. See id. at A58; see also Lisa Belkin, What the JunansDidn'tKnow About Michael, N.Y.
TIMES, March 14, 1999, at 42.
6. See Saul, supra note 4, at A59.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF WRONGFUL ADOPTION AS A CAUSE OF
ACTION

Contrary to what the phrase may suggest, "wrongful adoption" is not
a cause of action against adoption agencies for creating an unwanted legal
union between a parent and a child. Rather, wrongful adoption refers to a
lawsuit brought by adoptive parents who were either intentionally or
negligently misinformed about the health of their adoptive child, and
subsequently suffer losses associated with raising a disabled child.7 States
that recognize wrongful adoption perceive it as a variation on traditional
common law principles.' States that have rejected the cause of action did
so because the cases before them did not satisfy the statutory elements of
either fraud or negligent misrepresentation. 9
The tort of wrongful adoption initially applied to only fraud-based
claims, but the term now encompasses negligent conduct by adoption
agencies.'0 Additionally, one jurisdiction allowed a claim for breach of
contract in a wrongful adoption factual scenario to survive a motion for
summary judgment.' Today courts are generally willing to hold adoption
agencies liable for misleading prospective parents.
A. Fraud-BasedWrongful Adoption Claims
Fraud is well-established in the common law, and its application in the
wrongful adoption setting requires that plaintiffs prove the typical fraud
elements, usually some variation of the following:
(1) a representation;
(2) which is material to the transaction at hand;
(3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness
as to whether it is true or false;
(4) with the intent of misleading another into relying on it;
(5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and
7. SeeMADELYNFREUNDLICH&LISAPETERSON,WRONGFLADOPTION:
PRACTICE 11 (1998).

LAW, POLICY AND

8. See Roe v. Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d 354,357 (111. App. Ct. 1992) (stating that by
recognizing causes of action that fit well within the established common law of the state, the whole
body of common law develops); see also Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 886 (Pa. 1994).
9. See Richard P. v. Vista del Mar Child Care Serv., 106 Cal. App. 3d 860,865-66 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1980). But see Cesnick v. Edgewood Baptist Church, 88 F.3d 902, 908 (11th Cir. 1996)
(upholding the district court's decision that the statute of limitations barred their common-law tort
claims, and noting in a footnote that nothing indicates that the state of Georgia even recognizes the
tort of wrongful adoption); Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles Dep't of Adoptions, 201 Cal. App.
3d 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that adoption agencies "should not be liable for mere

negligence in providing information regarding the health of a prospective adoptee").
10. See FREUNDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 7.
11. See Cesnick,88 F.3d at 909.
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(6) resulting injury that was caused by the reliance. 2
Ohio became the first state to announce that an adoption agency which
fraudulently misrepresented13 an adoptive child's health history could be
held liable for damages. 4 In Burrv. Boardof County Commissioners,the
prospective parents contacted the adoption division of the Stark County
Welfare Department to express their interest in adopting a child. 5 The
agency introduced the couple to a child they described as a "nice big,
healthy, baby boy," given up for adoption by a teenage mother who left the
state seeking better employment.16 Relying on the factual background
given to them by the adoption agency, the couple adopted the boy and
brought him into their family. 7 Not long after the adoption, the child began
experiencing physical and mental problems, and was classified as educable
mentally retarded in grade school.' 8 Later, doctors diagnosed the boy with
Huntington's Disease. " After successfully obtaining a court order to open
their child's sealed medical records, the Burrs discovered that all of the
information given to them by the adoption agency about their child's
history was false.20 The boy's mother was not a teenager and had actually
given birth to her son in a mental hospital. 21 Furthermore, records in the
agency's possession prior to the adoption indicated that the infant was
developing slowly. The agency never relayed this information to the
Burrs 22
The court held that the Burrs successfully met each element of fraud.'
It upheld the award of $125,000 in damages, finding the amount an
appropriate figure to cover medical bills, expenses, and the couple's
emotional distress.24

12. See FREUNDLCH & PETERSON, supra note 7, at 12.
13. This cause of action is sometimes referred to as intentional or deliberate
misrepresentation. See MADELYN DEWOODY, ADOPTION AND DISCLOSURE 9 (1993).

14. See Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1105 (Ohio 1986).
15. Id. at 1103.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 1103-04.
21. See id at 1104. Many additional aspects of the boy's early history were concealed from
his future parents. See id. For instance, there was some evidence suggesting that the child's father

may also have been a mental patient. See id. The mother and baby shared similarly low intellectual
levels. See id. Finally, an expert testified that the child's early medical profile put at him at risk for
Huntington's Disease. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 1106.
24. See id. at 1108.
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Several jurisdictions recognize the analogous tort of intentional nondisclosure,25 and allow plaintiffs to argue both causes of action simultaneously. 26 This sister cause of action only differs in that it must be proven
that the offending party purposefully conceals a material fact, as opposed
to making an affirmative misrepresentation.27
Public policy supports holding adoption agencies liable for fraud when
they dishonestly convey or withhold vital health and background information. 28 Far from establishing adoption agencies as the guarantors of the
children they place in adoptive homes,29 an honest approach to the
placement of special needs children encourages their future success and
development." Furthermore, victims of wrongful adoption often experience acute guilt upon realizing that they would not have adopted the child
now in their home had the agency revealed the child's background
information prior to placement." It is obviously in the best interests of all
parties to an adoption that the a agency inform the adoptive parents about
all material details of the child's background.

25. See Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dep't of Adoptions, 201 Cal. App. 3d 859, 875
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
26. See id. at 872.
27. See Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 888 n.12 (Pa. 1994). Freundlich and Peterson
characterize the Jumancase as one ofdeliberate concealment. See FREUNDLCH&PETERSON,supra
note 7, at 14. However, the distinction is illusory: intentional misrepresentation, deliberate
concealment and intentional nondisclosure are all variations of fraud.
28. See Roe v. CatholicCharities, 588 N.E.2d 354, 360 (II. App. Ct. 1992); see also Michael
J., 201 Cal. App. 3d at 875 ("Public policy cannot extend to condone concealment or intentional
misrepresentation which misleads prospective adoptive parents about the unusual calamity they are
assuming. The adoption of a child is an act of compassion, love and humanitarian concern where
the adoptive parent voluntarily assumes enormous legal, moral, social and financial obligations.");
Wolford v. Children's Home Soc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 577, 582 (S.D.W.V. 1998) (holding that West
Virginian public policy fully supports a fraud-based claim of wrongful adoption).
29. See Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 360.
30. See id. Disabled or problem children will be placed with parents who are prepared both
financially and emotionally to deal with their special needs. See Id. Also, the likelihood of effective
treatment for the child's illness or disability increases if the parents can provide the child's entire
health history to future health care providers. See id.
31. See Juman v. Louise Wise Serv., 663 N.Y.S.2d 483, 486 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). The
couple stated that, "they would not have made a positive decision to adopt Michael if the defendant
had disclosed that the birth mother suffered from schizophrenia and had had a frontal lobotomy."
Id. Before filing suit against Louise Wise, the Jumans wrestled with these emotions, wondering if
the suit would appear to the public as though they regretted raising the son they loved so much. See
Marc Freeman, Son's ConcealedPastDrivesPairin Adoption Lawsuit, PAUI BEACHPOST, March
30,1998, at IA; see alsoBurr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1106 (Ohio 1986).
During direct examination, Mr. Burr testified that he would not have adopted the child if he had
been made aware of the child's complete family health background. See id. at 1106 n.3.
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B. Negligence-Based Wrongful Adoption Claims
When injured parents began to bring cases of adoption agency
negligence 2 to the courts, the issue was brought to the forefront. Realizing
the similarly damaging impact that negligent behavior can have on
unsuspecting parents, the courts began recognizing that adoption agencies
have a duty to both provide truthful responses to questions about a child's
health and affirmatively provide only honest information.33 The earliest
example of a court recognizing a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation by an adoption agency was Meracle v. Children'sService Society.'
In that case, the parents of a severely ill child sued the Children's Service
Society for negligently misrepresenting the child's family background and
health history.35 The Meracles told Children's Service Society that they
would adopt any child that did not have a debilitating or terminal disease,
and the agency soon placed a twenty-three month old baby with them.36
The agency told the parents that the baby's grandmother suffered from
Huntington's disease but misinformed them about the likelihood of their
child developing the illness.37 In addition, the agency inaccurately stated
for the same disease.38 The child
that the child's father had tested negative
39
eventually developed the fatal illness.
The court, after noting the failure of other jurisdictions to recognize a
negligence-based claim for wrongful adoption, ruled in favor of the
Meracles. 4 Critical to its decision were the unique facts of the Meracle
case4 ' that differed from prior negligent misrepresentation cases.42 In
32. The courts see no reason to distinguish the pleading requirements for negligent
misrepresentation actions from other negligence actions. See W. PAGEKEEONETAL,PROSSERAqD
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 745 (5th ed. 1984). Thus, a plaintiff alleging a claim of
negligence-based wrongful adoption must establish that: (1) the adoption agency owed a duty to
adoptive parents; (2) the adoption agency breached that duty; and (3) the adoptive parents were
injured because of the agency's breach of duty. See FREUNDICH &PE3ERSON, supra note 7, at 17.
33. See FREUNDLUCH & PETERSON, supra note 7, at 16.
34. 437 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Wis. 1989).
35. See id. at 533.
36. See id.

37. See id. Specifically, the agency told the parents that the disease is genetic, and that the
failure of one generation to inherit the illness meant that later generations would not be at any
greater risk to the disease than anyone else. See id. at 533. In fact, as the Meracle's discovered after
watching an episode of 60 Minutes which reported on the disease, a child whose parent has
Huntington's Disease has a 50% chance of inheriting it. See id.
38. See id. The Meracles learned from the same episode of 60 Minutes that there is no test
to determine whether someone had inherited the disease. See id.
39. See id
40. See id. at 537.
41. See id.

42. See e.g., Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373 (Cal.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss5/7

6

Shultz: Ignoring Distress Signals: Why Courts Recognize Emotional Distres

WRONGFUL ADOPTION CLAIMS

Meracle, the adoption agency voluntarily assumed the duty of explaining
Huntington's Disease to the adoptive parents.43 The court held that once an
agency volunteered information about a child's health, it could not
negligently convey this information or carelessly speculate about the
child's future well-being.' Its limited holding intentionally avoided
imposing an obligation on agencies to disclose known information to
prospective parents.' The court further declined to speculate whether
adoption agencies have a duty to investigate the health backgrounds of the
children they place. '
Moving further along the continuum, the court in M.H. v. Caritas
Family Services47 held an agency liable for negligent misrepresentations
through nondisclosure. 8 In M.H., a couple obtained the assistance of
Caritas Family Services in adopting a child that did not have a severe
mental disability.49 A nun responsible for placements informed the couple
about a suitable child.50 In conversations with the couple about the baby
boy, the nun vaguely mentioned that there was a possibility of incest in the
child's background that might cause future developmental abnormalities."
Nevertheless, the parents adopted the child, seemingly unmoved by the
casual comment.5 2 Soon after the adoption, the boy began having emo-

App. Div. 1980) (disallowing a negligent misrepresentation claim against an adoption agency
because the agency disclosed all of the information in their possession).
43. See Meracle, 437 N.W.2d at 537.
44. See id. The court stated that, "[t]o avoid liability, agencies simply must refrain from
making affirmative misrepresentations about a child's health." Id.; see also Mallette v. Children's
Friend & Serv., 661 A.2d 67, 73 (R.I. 1995) (stating that when agencies say nothing to avoid
liability, it should alert parents to very carefully consider the particular adoptee); Michael J. v. Los
Angeles County Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). In MichaelJ., the
adopted child had an extensive birthmark across much of his body, and the adoption agency
represented that the mark made him a hard to place child. See id. at 505. However, the agency
possessed records in which a doctor stated that he would not give a prognosis for the child at the
time. See id. In fact, the birthmark was a manifestation of Sturge-Weber Syndrome, an illness that
the agency either knew or should have known afflicted the young boy. See id. at 513. The court
ruled that although in this case the nondisclosure of thedoctor's records constituted negligence, and
possibly fraud, "mere negligence in providing information regarding the health of a prospective
adoptee" would not give rise to a cause of action. Id.
45. See Meracle, 437 N.W.2d at 537.
46. See id.

47. 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992).
48.

See id. at 288; see also KEETON, supra note 32, § 106, at 738 (stating that a defendant

who chooses to disclose must reveal enough information to prevent misleading interpretations).
49. See M.H., 488 N.W.2d at 284. Caritas Family Services was a Catholic social service
agency that placed children for adoption. See id.
50. See id. at 285.
51. See id.
52. See id.
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tional and behavioral problems.53 A doctor treating the child requested
additional information from Caritas Family Services about the boy's
genetic background, and in response Caritas sent the doctor a report
indicating that the child's parents were brother and sister.54 Caritas
eventually admitted that it had known the true history of the boy's
lineage. 55 The parents sued Caritas Family Services for negligently
communicating this information.56
In holding in favor of the parents, the court imposed a duty on adoption
agencies to completely and accurately convey all information about a
child's background once it undertook to communicate any information
about his background. 7 By withholding details, Caritas Family Services
had misled the parents and caused them damage.58 Although it was initially
a fraud-based cause of action, wrongful adoption now appropriately
encompasses negligence as a basis for recovery. 9
Ill. DUTY TO DISCLOSE

Courts can extract a duty to disclose relevant information to prospective
parents about an adoptee's health and family background from both state
disclosure statutes and the common law. Generally, imposition of a duty
to disclose on adoption agencies has the widespread support of commenta60
a significant number of state courts. 61
tors," and more recently,
A. Statutory Basis
States differ widely in the nature and breadth of their disclosure
statutes. 62 Some statutes require extensive disclosure, mandating that
adoption agencies collect information regarding an adoptive child's
background. 6 However, other states have weak disclosure statutes that fail

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 286.
See id. at 288; see also Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 46 (Mont. 1998) (stating that

an agency needed to use due care in providing background information to adoptive parents).
58. See M.H., 488 N.W.2d at 288.
59. See FRUENDLICH & PETERSON, supra note 7, at 11.
60. See, e.g., D. Marianne Brower Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil: A Blueprintfor
LegislativeReform of the Disclosureof Health-RelatedInformation in Adoption, 70 N.C. L. REV.
681,699 (1992).

61. See Roe v. Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d 354, 365 (Ii. App. Ct. 1992); see also Mohr
v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 1112 (Mass. 1995); Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882,891 (Pa.
1994).
62. See DEWOODY, supra note 13, at 19-20.
63. See DEWOODY, supra note 13, at 15.
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to provide a cause of action for aggrieved parents.' 4 Beyond the mere
existence of disclosure provisions,65 states vary with respect to the type of
information subject to disclosure,' the subjects of inquiry,67 the applicable
time for
disclosure,"a and the extent of a duty to verify collected informa9
6

tion.

Unfortunately, very few states impose penalties on adoption agencies
that fail to comply with their disclosure statutes. 70 Even without imposing
automatic liability, however, the mere presence of a statute requiring
disclosure suggests that concealment is unreasonable.71 Typically, a court
will consider agency liability predicated on both non-compliance with a
state disclosure statute, and common law causes of action based on fraud
and/or negligent or intentional misrepresentations. 7' Even more dramati

64. See FREUNDLICH&PETERSON,supra note 7, at 34. But see Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d

35, 49-50 (Mont. 1998) (finding the state agency statutorily liable for not specifically delineating
the information that should have been disclosed, and additionally, when combined with a state
manual for handling adoptions, suggesting that all background information about the child and its
biological parents must be disclosed).
65. See DEWOODY, supra note 13, at 15. Most states mandate disclosure of some nonidentifying information. See id. at 22. Others, including Delaware, Oklahoma, and South Carolina,
allow the agency to decide whether to disclose information. See id.at 23. The District of Columbia,
Louisiana, Maine, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Tennessee all permit the courts to use
discretion in decisions regarding disclosure. See id. at 24.
66. See FREUNDLICH &PETERSON, supra note 7, at 34; DEWOODY, supranote 13, at 17-18.
For instance, most statutes require that the agency provide parents with the medical histories of both
the child and the birth parents. See DEWOODY, supra note 13, at 18. A few states require disclosure
of a child's social and/or educational history. See id.
67. See FREUNDUHcH& PETERSON, supra note 7, at 34.
68. See id.

69. See id. Very few states impose affirmative obligations on adoption agencies to investigate
the health backgrounds of the children in their care. See DEWOODY, supra note 13, at 48. Even
states that do impose a duty to investigate fail to indicate the extent of such investigations. See id.
at 18.
70. See DEwOODY, supra note 13, at 60. Some even limit liability for agencies that fail to
comply with the statute. See id.; see also FREUNDUCH & PETERSON, supra note 7, at 34.
71. See D. Marianne Brower Blair, Getting the Whole Truth andNothing But the Truth: The
Limits of Liabilityfor WrongfulAdoption, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 851, 919 (1992). The author

suggests that when mandatory disclosure statutes are violated, there is, "at least ... prima facie
evidence of breach of duty" even if there may not be negligence per se. Ld. at 920; see also Gibbs
v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 892 (Pa. 1994) (stating that under common law a duty may be established
by statute).
72. See Jackson v. Montana, 956 P.2d 35, 47, 51 (Mont. 1998); see also Wolford v.
Children's Home Soc'y, 17 F. Supp. 2d 577, 583 (S.D.W.V. 1998).Wolford provides a good
example of how to premise liability for wrongful adoption on a disclosure statute. The West
Virginia Legislature drafted a statute that holds adoption agencies liable for failing to disclose
pertinent information. See id. Additionally, the West Virginia statutes include a general substantive
provision that creates liability whenever the facts of a particular case show that the plaintiff is a
member of a protected class, the legislature intended for a private cause of action to exist, the cause

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 5 [2000], Art. 7
FLORIDA LAW REWEW

[VoL 52

cally, recent cases suggest that a court may impose liability for violations
of statutory disclosure provisions that the state enacted after the initiation
of a wrongful adoption suit.73
B. Common Law Basis
Although scholarly discourse on wrongful adoption supports a
presumption of adoption agency liability for failure to disclose material
information to prospective parents, only a few courts have supported an
affirmative duty to disclose.74 Requiring adoption agencies to disclose vital
background information furthers the interests of all parties involved in
adoption proceedings. Some of the noted benefits of a duty to disclose
include: guiding early treatment of a child with medical or psychological
problems,75 informing a child about the child's medical history (which is
important for the individual's current well-being and for the child's future
decisions about childbearing), 76 reassuring adoptive parents that they are
receiving the fullest picture of their child's history, 77 and providing
adoptive parents with information that is vital to their decisions of whether
or not to adopt. 78
Others argue that imposing an affirmative duty to disclose on adoption
agencies would limit the number of adoptions, 79 create negative selfimages in adopted children,"0 invade the privacy rights of birth parents and
their families,"' and inspire an unhealthy arms race among parents for the
"best" child.82 Notwithstanding these concerns, the adoption community
almost universally supports full disclosure of medical and social informa-

of action correlates to the legislative scheme, and the cause of action does not invade the realm of
the federal government. See id. at 583 (citing W.VA. CODE § 55-7-9 (1994)). Because the disclosure
statute expressed a state policy supportive of open adoptions and the factual situation in the case
fit the private cause of action statute, the Wolford court found a private cause of action against

adoption agencies for failure to disclose. See id. Finally, the court noted that by refraining from
immunizing adoption agencies from tort liability, the legislature impliedly approved of private
causes of action. See id. at 584.
73. See FREuNDUCH&PETERSON,supra note 7, at34; see also Mallette v. Children's Friend
& Serv., 661 A.2d 67, 70 (R.I. 1995) (holding an agency liable for breaching a duty of care to
prospective parents despite the absence of a statute requiring disclosure).
74. See sources cited supra note 61.
75. See FREUNDUCH & PETERSON, supra note 7, at 8.

76. See id.
77. See id.

78. See id.
79. See Blair, supra note 60, at 696.
80. See id. at 697.
81. See id. at 698. Indeed, some parents might choose to forego adoption as an alternative if
it means being subject to in-depth questioning. See id.
82. See id.
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tion to adoptive parents.8 3 The benefits outweigh the costs, and even the
costs can be reduced or eliminated in many instances. For example, there
is little authority to support the contention that special needs children
remain unadopted for long periods of time." There are many more
adoptive children than parents,"5 and there are numerous parents that are
willing and even looking to raise a child with a disability. 6 Counseling
during the initial stages of adoption can reduce the possibility of mistaken
stigmatization associated with a risk of disease in a child's background.87
Furthermore, while the privacy interests of birth parents demand due
respect," it is often the case that birth parents sacrifice their own privacy
concerns voluntarilyto update adoption agencies with biological information about themselves as it develops.89 Finally, the argument that parents
would compete for the perfect baby is misguided,' because of the high
ratio of prospective parents to adoptive children.9 '
Although there is considerable scholarly support for an affirmative duty
to disclose,9 2 only a few courts have recognized and imposed this duty.93

The first step toward establishing an affirmative duty to disclose is to
recognize an obligation on the part of adoption agencies to answer
questions about a child's background truthfully and completely. In Roe v.
Catholic Charities, a court took this initial step. 9 In this case, the parents
told the agency that they wanted to adopt a healthy child. 96 The couple
eventually adopted a boy whom a social worker for Catholic Charities
characterized as, "a normal child who only needed lots of love."'
However, Catholic Charities knew that the boy had behavioral and
emotional problems and that he had seen several mental health care
providers to address these issues,9 but Catholic Charities never revealed
this information to the adoptive parents, even when the parents asked

83. See id. at 698-99.
84. See id. at 707.
85. See id. at 712. For every adoptive child, there are 20 couples looking to adopt. See id.
86. See id.
at 707.
87. See id. at 708-09.
88. See id. at712.
89. Seeid.at711.
90. See id. at712.
91. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
92. See Note, When Love Is Not Enough: Toward a Unified Wrongful Adoption Tort, 105
HARv. L. REv. 1761, 1773 (1992); see also Blair, supra note 60, at 707.

93. See sources cited supra note 61.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

588 N.E.2d 354 (111. App. Ct. 1992).
See id; see also FREUNDLUCH & PETERSON, supra note 7, at 20.
See Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 356.
Id.
See id.
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specific questions about the child's personality." The court in this case
held that a social worker had a duty to honestly answer prospective
parents' questions about the adoptive child that the social worker placed.100
Relying on traditional tort principles, the court found Catholic Charities
liable because the agency could foresee the serious consequences of its
actions." 1 Furthermore, the court found that the burden imposed on social
workers to comply with this duty was minimal because it simply involved
giving prospective parents accurate answers to their questions." ° Finally,
the court viewed its requirement of full disclosure as supportive of
adoption and the family unit in general.0 3
The next step was to address adoption agency silence. In Gibbs v.
Ernst,104 a court held for the first time that an adoption agency could not
avoid liability simply by revealing nothing.0 5 In that case, an adoptive
couple repeatedly requested information about their child's background,
and the agency continuously reassured the parents that they had been given
all information available about the child's history'0 6 The Gibbs court
found that the adoption agency had kept many details from the parents,"°
and announced an obligation for adoption agencies to, "make reasonable
efforts to reveal fully and accurately all non-identifying information in
their possession to the adopting parents."'18
Following Gibbs, the court in Mohr v. Commonwealth even further
refined the duty of adoption agencies to disclose."°9 In this case, a couple
sought to adopt a child from the Massachusetts Department of Public
Welfare." 0 The Department warned the prospective parents that the
children in the Department's care often have emotional problems."' In
response the couple indicated that they would consider a child with either
a correctable medical or emotional problem, 12 but would not consider a

99.
100.
101.
102.

See id.
See id.at 365.
See id.
See id. at 365; see also Jackson, 956 P.2d at 46-47 (finding that the need for parents to

be fully-informed about an adoptive child's background prior to adoption justifies the slight burden
on adoption agencies).

103. See Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 365. The court noted that support of the family unit is a public
policy concern of the State of Illinois, as expressed in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act. See id.at 365-66.
104. 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994).
105. See id; see also FREUNDUCH & PETERSON, supra note 7, at 21.
106. See Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 886.
107. See id. at 893.

108. Id.
109. 653 N.E.2d 1104,1112 (Mass. 1995).

110. See id. at 1107.
111. Seeid.
112. See id.
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"special needs" child.1 3 Eventually, the couple adopted a girl named
Elizabeth who they were told suffered from malnutrition and was being
tested for dwarfism." 4 Although the Department possessed diagnostic
information indicating that Elizabeth was mentally retarded and that her
mother suffered from schizophrenia, it never disclosed this information to
the future parents." 5 The couple soon noticed that Elizabeth exhibited
disruptive behavior and was developing slowly." 6 Many years later, while
obtaining immunization records for Elizabeth, Mrs. Mohr discovered the
hidden facts about Elizabeth's medical background." 7
The plaintiffs sued for wrongful adoption, and after considering the
competing policy issues,"' the court approved their claim of negligent
misrepresentation." 9 This unique case was the first to establish an
affirmative obligation on adoption agencies to disclose relevant information even absent parental questions. The court gave no indication that the
Mohrs ever questioned the Department about specific aspects of Elizabeth's medical or family history 20 Rather, the Department had simply
refrained from volunteering any information.' In squarely confronting this
deception, the court announced that, "an adoption agency does have an
affirmative duty to disclose to adoptive parents information about a child
that will enable them to make a knowledgeable decision about whether to
accept the child for adoption."'' 22 To comply with this duty, the court held
that an agency use "due care" in reporting background information to
prospective parents.2
Given a history that suggests that courts will rely on either statutory
language or common law principles to find adoption agencies liable for

113. See id.
at 1107 n.5.
114. See id. at 1107. The Department gave the couple superficial details about the girl's
mother, specifically about her appearance and career goals. See id.
115. See id.at 1106-07.
116. See U at ll07.
117. See iaLThe plaintiffs admitted that they would have refrained from adopting Elizabeth

had they known about her medical background. See id.
at 1108.
118. See id.at 1112. The court found that full disclosure enabled the adoptive parents to
ensure that the child would receive appropriate medical care at an early age. See id.Also, full
disclosure facilitated informed decisions regarding whether to adopt. See id.Finally, the court
realized that adoptive parents who are well-informed will naturally feel reassured about the
adoption process and more confident that the agency has given them honest information. See id.
at
1112-13.
119. Seei. at 1112.
120. It is possible that the decision simply does not mention that the Mohrs asked about

Elizabeth's background, when in fact they did. If this is the case, then the decision easily falls into
the analytical framework of Gibbs v.Ernst,647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994).
121. See Mohr,653 N.E.2d at 1107.
122. Id.at 1112.
123. Id. at 1113.
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fraudulent and negligent statements or omissions to adoptive parents, it
seems clear that only full, truthful disclosure of background information
to parents will shield adoption agencies from liability.

III. DUTY TO INVESTIGATE
Although courts are slowly beginning to impose a duty on adoption
agencies to disclose information from the medical records and biographies
in their possession, no court has been willing to compel adoption agencies
to independently investigate the backgrounds of the children they seek to
place. Courts consistently refuse to burden adoption agencies with a duty
to investigate. For example, the court in Gibbs declined to recognize a duty
to investigate because the relevant adoption statute imposed no such
obligation. 2 4 The Mohr court avoided the question, stating in a footnote:
This is not a case where an adoption agency placed a child
without discovering and informing the potential adoptive
parents about the child's medical and familial background.
Thus, we need not and do not address whether and to what
extent an agency has a duty to investigate a child's background. 15
Commentators have not followed the slow pace of the courts in
acknowledging the need to impose a duty to investigate on adoption
agencies. Rather, many of those studying the evolution of wrongful
adoption criticize the courts' reasons for refusing to impose a duty to
investigate on adoption agencies. 26 The overarching concern among this
segment of the legal community is that by failing to acknowledge a duty to
investigate, courts encourage adoption agencies to gather as little information as possible because the agencies know that the sufficiency of their
collection efforts will go unchallenged. 7 Commentators are quick to

124. See Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882,894 (Pa. 1994). The decision references 23 PA. CONST.
STAT. § 2533(b)(12) which requires that the intermediary involved in the adoption provide a
"statement that medical history was obtained and if not obtained, a statement of the reason

therefor." Id. At best, the court notes that this might imply that an agency worker use his/her best
efforts to obtain the records, but falls far short of imposing a duty to investigate. Id. However,
earlier the court stated that, "[adoption] agencies are only under the obligation to make reasonable
efforts to determine if their statements are true." I. at 891. While the court notes that burdensome
investigations can be avoided, it seems to suggest that investigations in less tedious instances would
be expected. See id.

125. Mohr, 653 N.E.2d at 1113 n.11.
126. See, e.g., Jennifer Emmaneel, Note, Beyond Wrongful Adoption: Expanding Adoption
Agency Liability to Include a Duty to Investigateand a Duty to Warn, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
181,228 (1999).
127. See FREUNDUCH & PETERSON, supra note 7, at 39-40.
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provide an endless list of catastrophic consequences resulting from a
failure to recognize a duty to investigate, without considering the128practical
implications of imposing this obligation on adoption agencies.
Beyond insisting on disclosure of known information, many feel that
adoption agencies should be required to conduct a reasonable investigation
into a child's medical and social history.1 29 They find support for a duty to
investigate in both state disclosure laws and policy arguments. Many state
disclosure laws imply the need for an investigation in order for an adoption
agency to be in full legal compliance, creating an elastic environment in
which courts could easily impose an obligation to investigate.130 However,
very few statutes explicitly require investigations, and those that do
provide vague guidelines for the scope of such an investigation. 131 Yet even
in states with limited or non-existent disclosure laws, supporters of a duty
to investigate
feel that judges are within their authority to enforce such an
13 2
obligation.
Several social and pragmatic barriers threaten the potential success of
an imposed duty to investigate. First, birth parents, much like adoptive
parents, run the risk of having to raise a child with a disability that an
investigation would not uncover, and thus there is no reason to take
additional steps for adoptive parents. This argument is rejected by
commentators who view adoptive parents as assuming a greater risk
because biological parents can investigate their own medical histories and
can at least be aware of some potential problems.133 Second, some argue
that courts would have a difficult time establishing the scope and extent of
a reasonable search.' 34 For example, should adoption intermediaries be
required to verify information given to them by biological parents?.35
Should an intermediary be obliged to verify a biological father when the
child's mother is unsure who the father is? 136 Should an investigation be

128.
129.
130.
131.

See id. at 40.
See Note, supra note 92, at 1773.
See id. at 1774.
See DEWOODY, supra note 13, at 48.

132. See Note, supra note 92, at 1774-75. The author states that a family lawjudge would not
be beyond his/her discretionary power in establishing a duty which is supportive of the adoption
process. See id. at 1774.
133. See id. at 1777. In response to the suggestion that adoptive parents should conduct their

own inquiries into the histories of their child's biological parents or be held comparatively
negligent, one court said, "We conclude that the plaintiffs had no duty to conduct the type of

investigation suggested by the Commonwealth." Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 1113
n.12 (Mass. 1995).
134. See FREuNDucH & PETERSON, supra note 7, at 42.

135. See id. at 43-44.
136. See id at40.
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handled through questionnaires or though personal interviews? 37 What
must an adoption agency uncover in order to comply with a "reasonable
investigation?" 138 Third, investigative agents risk invading the birth
parents' privacy rights. 139 Fourth, adoption agencies may not be able to
provide the necessary financial"4 and labor resources1 41 to conduct an
adequate search. Fifth, the burden on adoption agencies to carry out this
type of investigation would not only strain financial resources, but might
diminish the number of adoptions. 42
Notwithstanding the above arguments, there are those who refuse to
consider an obligation to investigate as an unfair burden, but rather
perceive it as a substantially less onerous hindrance compared to that of
raising a disabled child without prior preparaion or commitment. 143 While

137. Blair suggests that the better alternative is to conduct interviews with biological parents.
See Blair, supra note 60, at 768. While the advantages of in-person interviews are clear for
example, (alleviating risk that the important questions go unanswered, ensuring that one parent is
not completing an application for the other, and targeting potential problem areas in the parents'

medical or psychological histories), many of the general concerns regarding a duty to investigate
are still present. For example, a person confronted in a live interview may feel like his/her privacy
is being infringed even more so than had he/she completed a questionnaire. See FREUNDU1CH &
PETERSON, supra note 7, at 41. As a result, one of the parents may not want to participate in the
interview, leaving holes in the parents' biographies.
138. One author suggests that a reasonable investigation "might include the child's genetic
background as well as doctor evaluations based on a [sic] standard physical and psychological
examinations." Emmaneel, supranote 126, at 228 (emphasis added). The problem is that without
some general understanding of what would be required of an investigation, adoption agencies
remain open to countless lawsuits surrounding this vague language.
139. See FREUNDLCH&PETERSON, supra note 7, at 41. The authors caution that birth parents
who are considering adoption might forego the option after learning that the adoption agency can
pry into their backgrounds, or they might seek out practitioners that do not conduct a background
see also Jackson v.
search but also fail to provide the full range of counseling services. See id.;
State, 956 P.2d 35, 50 (Mont. 1998).
140. But see Note, supra note 92, at 1178 (stating that fulfillment of an obligation to
investigate would not cost very much because private agencies usually place infants, and state
agencies that typically place older children would expend little in conducting an investigation
because many of their children are already a part of the state welfare system, enabling the adoption
agency to complete an investigation merely by compiling the various government documents about
a particular child). The small expenses that are required to complete a reasonable investigation that
may reveal that a child has or will develop physical and/or emotional problems represents an
expense that all of society should bear as a cost of raising disabled children. See id. Such an
expense should not rest entirely on those who can not bear children of their own. See id. Some
states require adoptive parents to fund their own investigation, thereby reducing the adoption
agency's own expenses to nothing. See Emmaneel, supra note 126, at 229.
141. See FREUNDUICH & PETERSON, supra note 7, at 41 (questioning whether social workers

engaged in counseling adoptive parents are appropriately trained to conduct an investigation of this
kind).
142. See Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 894 (Pa. 1994).
143. See Emmaneel, supra note 126, at 228; see alsoBlair, supra note 71, at 917 (stating that
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riddled with numerous impracticalities, the attractiveness of a duty to
investigate continues to fuel the current debate surrounding wrongful
adoption.
IV. RECOVERY PROBLEMS

While the discussion surrounding wrongful adoption tends to focus on
whether or not to impose an obligation on adoption agencies to investigate
the backgrounds of the children they place, there has been relatively little
commentary concerning the difficulties that victims of wrongful adoption
encounter in recovering damages from adoption agencies. Commentators
concern themselves with prevention, but once the damage is done, the legal
system provides little recovery for aggrieved parents. Victims of wrongful
adoption must be able to recover for losses associated with the intentional
and negligent misrepresentations made by adoption agencies. However,
many courts have erected formidable obstacles to recovery, leaving
numerous victims of wrongful adoption uncompensated for unanticipated
and unprecedented financial losses.l4
The Juman case exemplifies the challenges that parents confront in
pursuing damages for wrongful adoption. Until their son died at age 29,
Marty and Phillis Juman supported Michael and paid for years of
psychiatric care, including expensive residential treatment exceeding $2
million. 45 The State of New York allowed Michael's parents to sue for
out-of-pocket expenses that accrued between the time that the adoption
agency's negligence was discovered and Michael's twenty-first birthday,
which amounted to three years." The care that the Jumans provided for
Michael in the eight years until his death went uncompensated. Marty
Juman suffered three heart attacks and also required psychiatric attention
for depression, but was denied compensation for these injuries.1 47 Even
more disconcerting, the Jumans were restricted from recovering for their
greatest injury, the pain that accompanied raising a schizophrenic child, by

by placing the burden on defendants to disclose information, adoptive parents can raise special
needs children, "with their eyes wide open"); Note, supra note 92, at 1778 (stating that the burden
of raising special needs children should be shouldered by all of society).
144. See Blair, supra note 71, at 893. The author states that uniformed adoptive parents are
less prepared than fully-aware parents both financially and emotionally to deal with a disabled
child. See id.
145. See Juman v. Louise Wise Servs., 608 N.Y.S.2d 612, 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
146. Mr. and Mrs. Juman provided their son his own apartment and supported his psychiatric
treatment until his death at age 29. Telephone Interview with Marty Juman (January 9, 2000).
However, the trial court held that New York law only entitled the Jumans to recover their out-ofpocket-expenses forMichael's illness up to the timeheturned 21. See Juman,608 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
147. See Juman, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 614.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 5 [2000], Art. 7
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[VOL 52

the State of New York's rules governing recovery in fraud-based cases.
The only other source of possible recovery still available to the Jumans149is
a claim for punitive damages that is pending in the New York courts.
Generally, parents suing for wrongful adoption can recover the
extraordinary medical expenses associated with raising a disabled child.150
Courts typically award damages for such pecuniary losses because they
represent the calculable consequence of withholding from adoptive parents
the option to choose whether or not to care for a special needs child."
Indeed, these expenses can be enormous. 52 But often, an award of medical
expenses reflects only a small portion of a parent's true loss, with
emotional suffering comprising the greatest component of that loss.
Initially at common law, courts would award damages for emotional
distress only when it accompanied an independent intentional tort such as
battery, assault, and false imprisonment.'53 Eventually, the courts realized
that it was arbitrary to limit recovery of emotional distress damages to
instances in which trauma accompanied certain delineated torts, 5 4 and they
began recognizing it as an independent action. 155 The general rule that has
liable for outrageous conduct that inflicts
emerged holds defendants
156
serious mental distress.
A. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES ASSOCIATED WITH FRAUD CLAIMS
In wrongful adoption suits, courts are split regarding whether a parent
suing under a theory of fraud or intentional misrepresentation can recover
emotional distress damages as a component of damages for the underlying
action."57 The Burr Court is the only court to allow recovery for emotional
58
distress in an intentional misrepresentation case of wrongful adoption.

148. See Juman v. Louise Wise Servs., 663 N.Y.S.2d 483,489 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
149. See id, at 490.
150. See Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Wis. 1989). The court
stated that, "[iut is only the extraordinary expenses, the unexpected expenses resulting from Erin's
special needs, which are actionable." Id.; see also Juman, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 488; Burr v. Board of
County Comm'ns, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1106 (Ohio 1986).
151. See Blair, supra note 71, at 888-89. The author suggests that this deprivation of a right
to choose is an injury itself, beyond emotional damages. See id. at 889.
152. See Burr,491 N.E.2d at 1109 (noting that the reported medical expenses for Patrick Burr
exceeded $80,000); see also Blair, supra note 71, at 892-93 (reporting that the Meracles' spent
more than $30,000 per year for their daughters medical care, and that residential care can cost up
to $15,000 per month).
153. See KEETON, supra note 32, § 12, at 57.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 60.

157. See Blair, supra note 71, at 904.
158. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1108.
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Other courts have suggested that they would allow recovery of emotional
distress damages if a parent could prove that the fraudulent conduct caused
159
physical injury.
Some courts simply refuse to award emotional distress damages in
intentional misrepresentation cases. For example, New York justifies its
adherence to this policy by summarily referring to its history of limiting
damages in fraud cases to pecuniary losses.' 6 Some courts flatly refuse to
award emotional distress damages in fraud cases without explaining their
reasoning, and simply refer to other courts that have such rules. 16' Besides
the argument that fraud is strictly an economic tort, 62 some contend that
emotional damages should not be awarded in fraud cases because the
parties do not contemplate these damages'63 and awarding such damages
would place the plaintiff in a better position than before the fraud
occurred."M
However, courts that have recognized emotional distress claims in fraud
cases counter by emphasizing the intentional nature of fraud as supportive
of recovery.1 61Particularly in a tort setting, defendants accused of fraud are
highly culpable and at least as liable for injury as their negligent counterparts."6 Herein lies the unique paradox associated with a fraud-based
wrongful adoption case: the defendant breaches a higher threshold of
wrongdoing than a negligent defendant, and yet the plaintiff alleging fraud
may be unable to utilize the same recovery mechanisms as plaintiffs
analogue pursuing a claim of negligence. Courts must abandon their
obsolete rules against awarding more than pecuniary damages in fraudbased wrongful adoption cases. Plaintiffs pursuing these causes of action
have suffered serious emotional distress which deserves compensation.
Allowing emotional distress claims to accompany fraud-based wrongful
adoption actions does not interfere with the customary policy reasons for
emotional distress claims. First, the number of plaintiffs who might bring

159. See, e.g., Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Wis. 1989); M.H.
v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282, 290 (Minn. 1992).
160. See Juman v. Louise Wise Servs., 663 N.Y.S.2d 483, 489 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
161. See Andrew L. Merrit, DamagesforEmotionalDistressin FraudLitigation:Dignitary
Torts in a Commercial Society, 42 VAND. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1989).
162. See Blair,supra note71, at 905. However, this argument fails to recognize the increasing
tendency for courts in other jurisdictions to recognize such claims.
163. See id. (stating that this principle derives from contract law and is thus inapplicable in the
tort arena).
164. See id. The problem with this argument, says the author, is that it tends to support

compensation for emotional injury rather than discourage it, because only by allowing emotional
distress damages can a plaintiff tnuly be restored to the position he/she occupied before the fraud.
See id.
165. See Merritt, supra note 161, at 6.
166. See id.
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such claims is low, limited in fact to the disabled child's parents. Second,
the types of injuries experienced by victimized parents are fully foreseeable
and are more often the basis for elaborate cover-ups of a child's true health
history. 67 Third, the emotional anguish experienced by parents in these
situations is virtually always genuine and severe. 168 Resorting to archaic
notions of the economic nature of fraud claims and established "rules"
constrains the ability of courts to fully compensate victims of a drastically
injurious tort.
Parents pursuing wrongful adoption claims must be able to recover for
their emotional suffering. Courts can ameliorate their general reluctance to
awarding emotional distress damages in fraud cases by limiting recovery
to specific types of fraud-based actions. Several jurisdictions support a
right to recover emotional distress damages in particular fraud-based
claims, which compare favorably with the wrongful adoption cause of
action. For example, some courts distinguish between business and nonbusiness frauds, allowing recovery for emotional distress injuries in the
latter, but not the former. 169 Public policy supports awarding damages for
non-business frauds, which are as likely to engender emotional distress
claims as negligence-based causes of action. This distinction obviously
supports allowing recovery for emotional distress in fraud-based wrongful
adoption suits because such claims are clearly non-commercial in nature.
Still other courts allow recovery only for severely injured fraud
victims. 7 ' This may be a less useful distinction for wrongful adoption
cases because it seems to re-emphasize what is currently a required
element of emotional distress without offering anything more."' Other
courts focus on the extent of financial damage, rather than the scope of
emotional injury.'7 2 Again, since wrongful adoption suits often generate
excessive losses,'73 this distinction would help more victims recover.
Finally, some courts allowjurors the discretion to consider and incorporate
emotional distress damages into an award of punitive damages.' 74 Even in

167. While searching for information about his birth parents, Michael Juman came across the
notes of the social worker responsible for his adoption. See Belkin, supranote 5, at47-48. Enclosed
were two separate accounts of his birth mother's history, one that the agency told the Jumans and
another that recounted the actual story of her early life. See id. at 47. "On every page [of the report],
it seemed to Martin [Marty], there was something else that sent his head spinning." Id.
168. See Blair, supra note 71, at 892.
169. See Merritt, supra note 161, at 10. However, the author notes that courts are not always

consistent in addressing this dichotomy. See id. at 11. For instance, some courts deny recovery in
personal actions while others allow recovery in purely commercial actions. See id.
170. See id. at 8.
171. See KEETON, supra note 32, § 12, at 63.
172. See Merritt, supra note 161, at 9.
173. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
174. See Merritt, supranote 161, at 12. Courts vary with respect to what kinds of fraud cases
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jurisdictions that prohibit awards of punitive damages to compensate
victims, judges may tacitly endorse this method by vaguely instructing
jurors to consider all factors in calculating punitive damage awards.' 75
More jurisdictions should allow suitable fraud-based claims to include
emotional distress damages. Further, those jurisdictions that have already
formed such a category should include fraud-based wrongful adoption
claims within that group.
Parents who have been misled by adoption agencies are entitled to
recover damages for the emotional distress associated with raising a child
with unanticipated health and behavioral problems. Courts must either
abandon their inflexible fraud rules, or develop or expand a category of
fraud claims, such as wrongful adoption fraud, which public policy
supports as an exception to these rules.
B. IntentionalInfliction of EmotionalDistress Claims
In jurisdictions that prohibit emotional distress claims associated with
fraud, a parent suing for wrongful adoption could try to establish an
independent action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 176 While
the requirements for pleading emotional distress as part of a fraud cause of
action may be vague, a plaintiff attempting to establish an independent
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress must prove
the following distinct elements:
(1) the defendant must have intended to upset the plaintiff or
must have acted with reckless disregard of the consequences;
(2) the conduct must have been "beyond all possible bounds
of decency, and... regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community"; and (3 the plaintiff's emotional distress must have been severe.
To establish that the plaintiff's distress is genuine, many courts require
plaintiffs to prove that the emotional trauma causedthe physical injury.'
Some wrongful adoption plaintiffs will not be able to demonstrate physical
injury. However, if the defendant's conduct is sufficiently outrageous, most
courts will overlook the physical injury requirement.' 79

are eligible for punitive damages awards. See id.
175. See id. at 14. In fact, appellate courts often support awards of punitive damages when it

was impossible to bring an emotional distress claim at the trial level. See id.
176. See generally id. at 15.

177. Il at 16 (quoting Harsha v. State Say. Bank, 346 N.W. 791, 801 (Iowa 1984)).
178. See KEETON, supra note 32, § 12, at 64.
179. See id.
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The outrageousness element, sometimes framed in terms of maliciousness or recklessness, often proves a stumbling block for plaintiffs pursuing
an independent claim for emotional distress damages in a negligence-based
wrongful adoption suit. In M.H. v. Caritas Family Services, the court
disallowed the parents' intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims because the adoption agency's conduct did not willfully or
maliciously intrude on their rights.' 80 It should be noted that M.H. was a
negligent misrepresentation case, thus raising the possibility that the
conduct of a defendant in an intentional misrepresentation case is
sufficiently outrageous to support an independent claim for emotional
distress damages.'
Indeed, the intentional actions of a fraudulent
defendant that cause damage to the plaintiff may be perceived as outrageous."8 2 However, as Professor Merritt satirically notes in his article,
courts often perceive183fraud as too commonplace to rise to the level of
outrageous conduct.
Given that many wrongful adoption plaintiffs will have a difficult time
proving either the physical injury or outrageousness necessary for an
independent claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, courts
should allow them to allege emotional distress as a component of their
claims for intentional or negligent misrepresentation.
C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional DistressClaims
In cases of negligent misrepresentation or when a defendant's conduct
is not sufficiently egregious, parents may pursue a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress."M Not surprisingly, courts are even less
likely to award emotional distress damages when the defendant acts
negligently, rather than intentionally.8 5 Herein lies the puzzle that prevents
victims of wrongful adoption from recovering damages for emotional
distress: courts are unwilling to award such damages in
intentional/fraudulent misrepresentation cases because of restricting

180. See 488 N.W.2d 282,290 (Minn. 1992). Cf. M.H. v. Caritas, 475 N.W.2d 94,100 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the defendant's conduct was not outrageous enough to support an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, but a negligent infliction of emotional distress

claim was proper because it accompanied an independent intentional tort).
181. See M.H., 488 N.W.2d at 288-89.
182. See KEETON, supra note 32, § 12, at 61.

183. See Merritt, supra note 161, at 19-20. Professor Merritt suggests that courts should
reconsider their aversion to awarding emotional distress damages in fraud cases rather than
constrain plaintiffs to the unworkable option of proving an intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim. See id. at 20-21.
184. See Blair, supra note 71, at 923.
185. See KEETON, supra note 32, § 54, at 360.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss5/7

22

Shultz: Ignoring Distress Signals: Why Courts Recognize Emotional Distres
20001

WRONGFUL ADOPTION CL4IMS

precedent and yet they are also reluctant to award such damages in cases
of mere negligent conduct.
Courts are generally reluctant to award damages for emotional distress
in negligence unless there is a showing of physical injury.1 6 Indeed, many
emotional distress claims in wrongful adoption lawsuits are summarily
dismissed due to a lack of physical injury at the time when the cause of
action first accrued." 7 However, the requirement of physical injury in
wrongful adoption cases is unnecessary and avoidable. Some states do not
require proof of physical injury at all in negligent infliction of emotional
distress cases. 188 Others forego the requirement when the conduct is
outrageous enough to cause severe mental distress.'89 Still another variation
dispenses with the physical injury requirement in the types of torts which
provide a legitimate basis for eliminating it."9 For instance, in cases of
negligent embalming and negligent transmission of a message involving
death, courts do not require a showing of physical injury because these
torts are particularly likely to generate genuine emotional distress. 9 In
wrongful birth cases, courts dispense with the physical injury element
because the parents' emotional distress is unquestionably sincere. 9
Similarly, the emotional grief experienced by parents apprized of their
adopted child's true health history is unlikely to be feigned.
Although some jurisdictions have a "zone of danger" requirement in
negligence-based emotional distress cases,' 93 this element is limited to
instances in which a third party claims emotional distress damages

186. See id. § 54, at 361.
187. See Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532,536 (Wis. 1989) (dismissing the
emotional distress claims because the parents had not shown physical injury).
188. See Blair, supra note 71, at 924. For example, Texas does not require plaintiffs to show
physical injury to successfully plead a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See id.
But see Meracle, 437 N.W.2d at 536, where the court stated that:
The rule that a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress must be
accompanied by physical injury is important and strikes "the appropriate balance

between the rights of injured parties to obtain a remedy for a wrong, and the rights
of defendants to be free from potentially unlimited liability and the meritless
claims."
(quoting
189.
190.
191.

LaFleur v. Mosher, 325 N.W.2d 314, 317 (Wisc. 1982)).
See KEnTON, supra note 32, § 54, at 361.
See id. at 362.
See id.

192. See Blair, supra note 71, at 927 (considering a wrongful birth scenario in which medical

providers made errors administering a test for Tay-Sachs which, if done correctly, would have
indicated the presence of the fatal illness in the unborn child).
193. See id. at 928.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 5 [2000], Art. 7
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

' Since adoption agencies owe
associated with witnessing harm to another. 94
a duty of care directly to adoptive parents, no third party is involved and
the distress associated with a breach of this duty is fully recoverable by the
95 Thus, the bystander rule is inapplicable in wrongful adoption
parents.
196
cases.
Another common fear expressed by courts unwilling to extend coverage
of emotional distress damages is that the injuries forming the basis of the
claim may be only temporary or minor in nature. 9 7 However, it is puzzling
why this concern should apply to wrongful adoption plaintiffs given that
their emotional distress symptoms are likely to continue over the duration
of their disabled child's life and beyond. Finally, some courts express the
concern that allowing recovery for emotional distress against wrongful
adoption defendants would unfairly punish them.1 98
However, there are two counter-arguments which undermine this
contention. First, some states already incorporate claims of emotional
distress into punitive damages awards, thereby suggesting that defendants
are not being unfairly punished by having to account for inflicting
emotional distress damages.'99 Second, even if the effect of such an award
outside of punitive damages does "punish" defendants, it is still not
inconsistent with public policy to place the burden of accounting for these
damages on the defendant. 2 °
In negligent misrepresentation cases and cases in which the defendant's
conduct is fraudulent but not outrageous, courts can and should compensate plaintiffs for negligent infliction of emotional distress. To accommodate this interest, however, courts may have to forego the physical injury'
constraint, something they have been willing to do in extreme cases that
compare favorably with wrongful adoption scenarios.20 '
D. PunitiveDamages
The intentional nature of fraud-based wrongful adoption claims lends
itself to punitive damage awards. 2" However, the limitations on grants of

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See KEETON, supra note 32, § 54, at 365; see also Blair, supra note 71, at 928.
See Blair, supra note 71, at 929.
See id.
See generallyKEETON, supranote 32, § 54, at 361.
See id.
See Merrit, supra note 161 and accompanying text.
See KEETON, supra note 32, § 54, at 361.

201. Marty Juman has experienced difficulties in establishing that the defendant's conduct was
the proximate cause of his heart attacks. Telephone Interview with Marty Juman (January 9, 2000).
202. See Blair, supra note 71, at 903. Cf. 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN,

PUNrIVE DAMAGEs 105 (2d ed. 1980) (arguing that an alleged fraud must be, "gross, oppressive,
or aggravated" to generate punitive damages unless there is a breach of trust or some other
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punitive damages generally suggest that courts should avoid relying on
them as an exclusive source of recovery in wrongful adoption suits. In
many cases, punitive damages do not fit within the framework of a
wrongful adoption lawsuit. For example, courts generally award punitive
damages only if a fraudulent misrepresentation is made maliciously or
willfully,0 3 a standard that may be impossible to establish in a wrongful
adoption case. On the other hand, some courts infer the intentional conduct
necessary to justify punitive damages from an entity's reckless disregard
for the truth,2"4 arguably a standard that some wrongful adoption cases
might meet.2 5
Other courts insist that the fraud be directed at the public in order for
an individual plaintiff to recover punitive damages.2" Within the unique
setting of wrongful adoption claims, it will be difficult to establish that an
adoption agency directs its conduct at the public unless that agency's
policy is to intentionally misrepresent the histories of all of its adoptees.
Finally, one must consider the track record: no court has yet awarded
punitive damages in a wrongful adoption case.2 7
While states vary with respect to the grounds necessary to establish a
claim for punitive damages, a cursory examination of some common
principles demonstrates why it would be a mistake for courts to rely solely
on punitive damages as a way of fully compensating aggrieved parents in
wrongful adoption cases. First, to satisfy a punitive damages claim, the
defendant's conduct must demand attention by establishing one of the
policy reasons for imposing punitive damages, which it may fail to do.20 8
Second, the defendant's conduct must be egregious, an element that
usually requires some degree of malice or evil motive, 9 which may also
be hard to prove. Other states interpret this requirement as necessitating a
"conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the
conduct may be called willful or wanton."210 Third, since courts generally

recognizable tort).
203. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 202, at 431.
204. See id. at 431-32.

205. See supra text accompanying note 164.
206. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 202, at 105.
207. See M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282,290 (Minn. 1992); see also Roe v.
Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d 354, 361 (111. App. Ct. 1992).
208. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 32, § 2, at 9. The relevant considerations include:
"punishing the defendant,.. . teaching the defendant not to do it again, and... deterring others
from following the defendant's example." Id. Wrongful adoption claims arguably satisfy the last

two reasons for imposing punitive damages.
209. See id. § 12, at 9-10; see also Roe, 588 N.E.2d at 361 (suggesting that the court denied
plaintiff s claim for punitive damages because his case lacked aggravating circumstances).
210. See KEETON, supra note 32, § 2, at 10; see, e.g., M.H. 488 N.W.2d at 290 (reversing the
appellate court's leave to amend the complaint and add a claim for punitive damages because the

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 5 [2000], Art. 7
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[VoL 52

perceive punitive damages as a windfall to plaintiffs,21 ' many judges use
their discretion to withhold this dangerous remedy from the jury,2 12 thereby
providing another reason why punitive damages are rarely awarded.
Only the Juman court entertained the possibility that a fraud-based
wrongful adoption case might support an award of exemplary damages.213
In rejecting the contention that the defendant's actions must be directed at
the public in order to establish punitive damages, the court allowed the
plaintiffs to retain their demand for punitive damages.214 This aspect of the
case is still before the New York courts.
While a fraud-based wrongful adoption claim may establish a basis for
imposing punitive damages,21 5 it is almost impossible to find support for
such an award in a negligent misrepresentation case. Indeed, it is generally
acknowledged that plaintiffs may not recover punitive damages for mere
negligence absent a contrary statutory provision.216 In some states,
plaintiffs can recover punitive damages if the defendant's conduct amounts
to gross negligence or recklessness. 2 7 Gross negligence typically differs
from regular negligence in that the former requires purposeful or willful
misconduct, 218 a standard that some wrongful adoption defendants might
satisfy. However, other states allow recovery for punitive damages only
when the gross negligence incorporates wantonness or recklessness, or
when the offender exhibits a gross disregard for the safety of others.219
The single greatest problem with supporting punitive damage awards
in wrongful adoption cases is the likelihood that such awards would be
motivated byjuror sympathy towards emotionally disturbed victims. Some
juries may award punitive damages in wrongful adoption cases for the
admittedly appropriate purpose of deterring future wrongful conduct or
punishing past wrongful behavior. However, other juries may award
punitive damages in wrongful adoption cases because of a desire to
compensate victims for their emotional suffering, either implicitly (through
plaintiffs did not establish that the defendant deliberately disregarded the safety of others). The
court of appeals had allowed the plaintiffs to add a claim for punitive damages merely because of

the intentional nature of their cause of action, intentional misrepresentation. See M.H. v. Caritas
Family Servs., 475 N.W.2d 94, 100 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).

211. See KEETON, supra note 32, § 2, at 14.
212. See id.
213. See Juman, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
214. See iL

215. See supranote 202 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112 (1927) (holding

constitutional an Alabama statute allowing juries to assess punitive damages in cases of wrongful
death due to mere negligence).
217. See Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260, 263 (Ky. 1998).

218. See Cooper v. County of Florence, 412 S.E.2d 417,418 (S.C. 1991); see also Kellar v.
People's Natural Gas Co., 352 N.W.2d 688, 693 (Iowa CL App. 1984).
219. See Ellis v. Golconda Corp., 352 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (Fla. Ist DCA 1977).
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discussions among jurors out of the judge's earshot) or explicitly (by a
judge's instructions to the jury to consider emotional distress in calculating
a punitive damages award). Although awards in the former case are
appropriate and necessary, awards in the latter case are misguided and
establish a bad legal precedent. Courts should heed this phenomenon, and
recognize injury where it lies-in the mental torment associated with being
victimized by improper adoption agency conduct.
Theoretically, punitive damages seem a viable alternative source of
compensation for seriously emotionally disturbed victims of wrongful
adoption. Realistically, punitive damages are a worthless option as
exemplified by the almost universal rejection of such awards in wrongful
adoption cases. Therefore, courts should only award punitive damages
when such an award does not serve as a proxy for emotional distress
damages.
V. CONCLUSION

Since its short history began, the tort of wrongful adoption has captured
the interest of many in the legal community. As the typical stances against
wrongful adoption claims weakened, vulnerable areas of the cause of
action emerged and gained scholarly attention. The early commentators
emphasized imposing a duty to disclose on adoption agencies. The case
law that followed established that adoption agencies can no longer make
intentional misrepresentations about an adoptee to prospective parents.
Further, adoption agencies cannot negligently make misleading statements
about an adoptee, and several cases hold that agencies cannot escape
liability by remaining silent.
The academics then shifted their attention to the need for adoption
agencies to investigate the backgrounds of children they place. Armed with
arguments to support this ideal, few stopped to consider the potential
questions concerning the nature and scope of a reasonable investigation.
With oierlooked problems often leading to litigation, it is not too farfetched to argue that imposition of a duty to investigate could bankrupt the
business of many private agencies unable to afford the legal expenses
associated with arranging adoptions.
The problem of unfulfilled loss has resurfaced over the course of the
short history of wrongful adoption, although it has never garnered
significant scholarly attention. Courts must recognize that emotional
distress damages are often an appropriate component of either a fraud or
negligence-based claim for wrongful adoption, and that punitive damages
should only be utilized to fill their proper role as a reminder to wrongdoers
who violate public policy. Through expansion of the traditional notions of
recovery, courts can better compensate those who are already victims. By
failing to compensate victims of wrongful adoption for their gravest
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injuries, we punish those who are already shouldering more than their
share of a societal burden.
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